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CTS and normativity: The essentials of preemptive counter-terrorism interventions 
 
Abstract 
This article critically assesses calls for ‘normativity’ in counter-radicalisation and 
counter-extremism, and suggests that aligning with hegemonic narratives about 
securing the ‘pre-crime’ space is problematic in a context of emancipation. Utilising 
interviews with a number of Prevent officials (including Channel ‘de-radicalisation’ 
mentors), the paper argues that when any counter-radicalization regime is implemented, 
two traits are necessarily inherent: identity construction, and ‘concerned concern’, both 
of which are based on subjective speculation about an individual’s future intent. Identity 
construction in preemptive counter-terrorism works through prejudiced human 
imagination in order to normalise perceived and ‘risky’ divergence, but which is mired 
in contradictions precisely because practitioners interpret risk (and therefore 
divergence) differently. Concerned concern is a paradoxical constitution both of 
support for and protection against individuals. Ultimately, in exploring these two 
concepts, the paper critically engages with the notion that Prevent is ‘just another 
safeguarding duty’. Building on earlier critical terrorism scholarship, this discussion 
shows how worst case logics apparent in national discourse are largely absent at the 
point of implementation, yet pejorative identity-construction and some suspicion (no 
matter how banalised) are implicit in any risk-managing scheme in a counter-terrorism 
context. These qualities are incompatible with an emancipatory agenda. 
 
Keywords 







The Prevent programme, the British ‘pre-crime’ security project that seeks to stop people 
supporting or becoming involved in terrorism, has been mired by claims of racial profiling and 
promoting divisiveness, and that it could end up “promoting extremism” (UN 2016). Its 
centrepiece and intervention arm, Channel, provides mentorship for those said to be most 
risky/at-risk of moving into criminality, and is looked to by other countries as exemplary 
practice (Thornton and Bouhana 2017). In the context of a Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) 
call for normativity, this piece critically assesses the implementation of Prevent as a project 
that promises counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism success (Baldet 2017). The 
criticism this paper provides is particularly appropriate given that “Prevent’s a project that’s… 
as good as the people inputting into it” (Interviewee 1, Channel mentor). After setting out the 
theoretical and empirical contribution this article provides, the discussion turns briefly to how 
counter-radicalisation referrals in Britain are administered. Following this, and utilising 
interviews with officials at the heart of Prevent and Channel, the paper suggests that two first 
principles are necessary for any preemptive counter-terrorism programme. The opening 
substantive section demonstrates the first of these two principles: the necessity of a subjective 
identity-fixing mechanism, which leads to varying identifications of risk being performed. The 
following section examines the second principle: the integral role of suspicion of subjects’ 
motives, emphasising how suspicion is often concealed through the rhetoric of ‘safeguarding’. 
The third section looks at reforms that would attempt to overcome these two first principles, 
suggesting their inevitable failure. The article concludes that before CTS adopts a ‘normative’ 
approach that seeks to improve or work with a preemptive counter-terrorism regime, it should 
first understand the necessary ingredients of such a regime’s implementation. 
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The paper indicates that the fixing of identities along the grounds of ‘possible risk’ is a 
function premised on conceptions of the ‘Other’ (Said 1979) and a desire to prevent possible 
future deviance occurring, and which necessarily works through a lack of knowledge, human 
prejudice and imagination (Lowe 2017). Despite the wishes of practitioners, this will always 
lead to varied interpretation of what constitutes a security risk. In conjunction with the 
subjectivity of imagining security risks, outlined in the second section is an exposition on how 
suspicion is administered through ‘concerned concern’. Concerned concern is posited as 
necessary trait of security preemption with a dual utility: it sees subjects both as vulnerable and 
as posing riskiness, as individuals in need of support themselves and whom society needs 
protecting from. In contrast, other areas of safeguarding focus only on the vulnerability of 
subjects (with the exception of gang-related safeguarding, discussed later). 
Working to identify where risk may exist within subjects as their ultimate goal, 
preemptive counter-terrorism regimes cannot escape their reliance upon the intensely 
subjective separation of ‘good’ (behaviour and perspectives) from ‘bad’, and of suspicion of 
the Other. Throughout the paper these two themes will be shown as central to any preemptive 
security regime: regardless of how often the Prevent Strategy is framed as ‘just another 
safeguarding tool’ which is “substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including 
child abuse or domestic violence” (HM Government 2011, 84), the strategy cannot escape these 
first principles. Ultimately it suggests that instead of these principles being irksome 
imperfections that can be ironed out, any scheme that acts on pre-intention subjects will only 
embolden the culture of violence thesis by placing pejorative labels on specific communities 
and individuals, and will embed suspicion in society. The paper therefore suggests that the 
‘logic’ of preemptive counter-terrorism (and counter-extremism) should not be considered in 
the context of emancipation. 
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As well as developing the relative empirical vacuum on Channel (Thornton and 
Bouhana 2017), this piece theorises about the ‘first principles’ of the implementation of 
counter-terrorism, following Jackson’s 2015 work in this journal, that exposed the structural 
requirements of any preemptive programme. He identifies four core characteristics:  
1) rejection of previous terrorism (or any) knowledge, 
2) governing the future through the unknown,  
3) the prioritisation and institutionalisation of imagination to identify threats, and  
4) the “acceptance of a permanent ontological condition of ‘waiting for terror’” (2015, 
35).  
Whilst preemptive counter-terrorism regimes are held up along these lines at the structural 
level, this article supplements Jackson’s thesis by identifying two traits as a necessary 
minimum at the implementation stage of preemptive counter-terrorism: prejudiced identity-
fixing (prescribing arbitrary and imagined subjectivities on individuals) and ‘concerned 
concern’, or ‘diluted suspicion’ (about an individual’s possible deviant trajectory). Although 
there is obvious crossover between these two traits and the four suggested by Jackson, this 
discussion argues that practitioners assume significantly different roles within the structure in 
contrast to the logic underpinning the structure, so much so that epistemological internal 
conflict is common and visceral. This distinction between structural justifications and 
practitioner implementation is highlighted by Martin (2014), who writes that community-level 
work in the ‘pre-crime’ space can be considered “preemption”, where the more targeted, 
individual-level Channel work can be understood as “precaution”. Yet, whilst this distinction 
may be true at a discursive and structural level, thresholds for intervention are so low that the 
work of Channel should hardly be considered precautionary. As another example, although 
Jackson (2015) writes that the programme of Prevent is justified on the grounds of ‘waiting for 
terror’, practitioners interviewed rarely narrated their role as related to preventing terrorism; 
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instead, their roles were explained as safeguarding practitioners largely unrelated to security-
bound risk-management. The logic of a preemptive counter-terrorism regime, at the 
administrative level, therefore needs exposing to see how far structural narratives are explicitly 
carried over, which allows for theorisation as to the essential mechanisms for a preemptive 
project to be undertaken. With the narrative being propagated and widely accepted (Busher et 
al. 2017) that Prevent is like any other safeguarding responsibility, the implementation stage is 
particularly important to excavate. 
The piece is informed by work produced by CTS scholars (for example: Heath-Kelly 
2017; Heath-Kelly et al. 2014; Jarvis 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2013; Martin 2014, 2018) and 
critical risk society scholars (for example: Amoore 2013; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ewald 
1991), who have sought to deconstruct hegemonic knowledge around ‘terrorism’ and 
approaches towards governing possible future subjectivities. A range of other academic work 
into the operation of Channel and Prevent was influential (Elshimi 2017; de Weert and Eijkman 
2018; Thornton and Bouhana 2017; Weeks 2017,2018; Spalek and Davies 2012). More 
fundamentally, this article is informed by Foucauldian conceptions of identity construction 
through discourse, research on Othering through space and identity construction (Springer 
2009, 2015; Massey 2005; Sian 2017), and the social production of terrorism ‘knowledge’ 
(Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Stampnitzky 2013; Jackson 2015). It follows Jarvis’ claim that calls 
for normativity only serve to legitimise internal and hegemonic assumptions about truth-
producing regimes: “Trading truths about terrorism… is critical only up to a point” (Jarvis, 
2009: 21). 
This article was informed by semi-structured interviews with 18 Prevent-related 
practitioners interviewed between September 2017 and September 2018, including 6 Channel 
mentors (out of 60-70 nationally). Others interviewed were (former and present) Regional 
Prevent Coordinators, Prevent Coordinators, local authority actors with responsibility for 
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Prevent, and two individuals delivering training funded by Prevent. Several interviewees also 
deliver official Prevent Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (‘WRAP’) training, one 
session of which was attended by the author. (Training session provided by Interviewee 5, a 
Prevent Coordinator). 
 
Functioning of Prevent 
Prevent was established as one of the four strands of a broader counter-terrorism strategy 
(called CONTEST) in Britain in 2003, which, in its earlier years, focused on fostering 
‘community cohesion’. Muslim populations were targeted with specific funding from the 
Prevent budget (DCLG 2007) in order to encourage integration into Britain, but as Prevent was 
located within a counter-terrorism scheme, its links with a security agenda did not go unnoticed 
(Thomas 2009). However, Prevent has since been decoupled from community cohesion work 
after being passed to the Home Office. Following the 7/7 attacks, the Prevent programme was 
made public, and it has since faced two significant amendments: in 2011 ‘non-violent 
extremism’ was assimilated into its remit, and in 2015 the Prevent Duty bestowed public sector 
workers with responsibility for spotting and reporting supposed ‘signs of radicalisation’. 
Channel was piloted in 2007 as the individual-intervention arm focussing on the most 
supposedly risky referrals made to Prevent, expanded over the following few years and rolled 
out nationally in 2012. The Extreme Risk Guidance (ERG) factors are 22 supposed ‘signs of 
radicalisation’ taken from studies of ‘extremist-related’ convicts, and which include “need for 
status [and] ‘them’ and ‘us’ thinking” apparently as showing an individual may be moving 
towards risky behaviour (NOMS 2014, 3-4, restricted; also reported publicly in CAGE 2016). 
Needless to say, the ERG are not objective metrics of ‘risk’ and were developed as “essentially 
working hypotheses” (NOMS 2014, 5). Moreover, Furneaux (2018, 39-40) writes that these 
metrics were from a study “originally devised to be used as a reoffending risk assessment in 
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prisons”, yet they were imposed into Prevent because the study was the only framework 
available when developing the ‘pre-crime’ policy. The science behind these signs has been 
seriously contested by practitioners and academics (including: Royal College of Psychiatrists 
2016; Knudsen 2018), not least for encouraging the reporting of a wide range of banal 
behaviours. Referrals are able to be made by any citizen in the country, but a large proportion 
are made through the education system (HM Government 2017, 2018). The ‘most risky’ 
Prevent referrals make their way up to local Channel panels (staffed primarily by local 
safeguarding leads), and the ‘most concerning’ of these - 300-400 per year (HM Government 
2017, 2018) - are offered Channel mentorship with one of the 60-70 Home Office-approved 
mentors (Interviewee 15, National Prevent Lead) until they are deemed ‘safe’ by the mentor 
and Channel panel. The article now turns to the substantive sections. 
 
Identity-fixing (of the Other) through ambiguity and subjectivity 
Central to the idea of counter-radicalisation is the management of supposed future risk. This 
rationale is intimately concerned with identifying the carriers of the possible development of 
malevolent intentions, in order for them to be intervened upon and the alleged risk negotiated. 
The identification or “visibilisation” (Martin 2018) of supposed spaces of risk is therefore 
fundamental to managing that ‘risk’, and the fixing of subjects on the basis of their possible 
propensity to develop some destructive subjectivity, is essential in order for them to be filtered 
and sorted according to their ‘likelihood of posing risk’. As indicated by Jackson (2015) the 
role of categorising risk is essential at a structural level. This section looks at the centrality 
during the local level of implementation of human prejudice behind identity-fixing (or ‘risk-
imagining’), and how distinctions of ‘us’ from ‘them’ - distinctions that Prevent supposedly 
attempts to combat - are outworked through the very implementation of Prevent. 
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Working on an unknown future, in trying to stop people who haven't demonstrated 
violent tendencies from becoming violent, highlights a number of problems, primarily that this 
space is plagued with ambiguity both conceptually and practically, which leads to the 
prioritisation of risk-imagining in this field of security, and a broad net being cast (Jackson 
2012, 2015). As Heath-Kelly (2017) writes, subjects become constituted by their destructive 
capacity, but simultaneously positioned as possible allies. This dual construction is 
symptomatic of working on the future in the present; both friend and foe are possible future 
subjectivities, but in order for ‘risk’ to be minimised potentially destructive subjectivities must 
be acted upon now. Importantly those deemed non-risky remain only ever principally in the 
non-risky space; they - along with society at large - are liable to their subjectivity being swiftly 
re-narrated as risky (Walker 2008). Because different possibilities are being explored in the 
attempt to ‘determine risk’ through the Channel process (i.e. ‘does this individual pose a threat 
or not?’), future risk is constantly being imagined (de Goede 2008; McCulloch and Wilson 
2016). The reliance upon risk-imagining is central to any programme that works to prevent 
violence. The infamy of Guy Fawkes relies on imagining his propensity to commit violence, 
because ultimately he may not have gone on to execute his plot. Obviously, this instance does 
not require a creative imagination to conceive of the risk he could have posed: he had placed 
gunpowder under Parliament. Imagination becomes more central when attempting the 
preemption of violence where no preparation has occurred but where possible and dangerous-
sounding divergence is perceived to exist. In short, governing possible future intent leads to 
varied interpretations and necessary contradictions between practitioners, because it relies on 
imagining risk. This was entirely apparent in all of the interviews, as we will see. 
The difficulty of identifying the future in the present means that any ‘working 
definitions’ must cast a wide net, and then rely upon practitioner judgment in the 
implementation stage. The Prevent Strategy explicitly notes that definitions that it provides 
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“relate to Prevent and are not always authoritative in any wider context” (HM Government 
2011, 107), inferring that indeed, its assumptions do not exist in some objective reality. But 
regardless of its position in wider research, even on its own self-fulfilling logic, ambiguity 
reigns. The Strategy takes extremism as the “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British 
Values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs" (HM Government 2011, 107). Yet several practitioners 
implementing the policy took issue with different elements of this definition, suggesting some 
(especially ‘British values’ and ‘tolerance of different faiths’) were contradictory or not 
relevant. One Channel mentor (Interviewee 8) observed, 
 
So if someone says ‘well actually I don’t believe in gay marriage’ is that homophobic 
and does it fall foul of British, universal values of tolerance and respect and diversity 
et cetera? So there has to be consistency. There are Christians and Jews and Muslims, 
traditional faiths, who hold a very traditional idea of what marriage should look like. 
And are they all viewed as extremists because of that? I don’t agree with that… So there 
is some conflict. 
 
The ERG principles underpinning Prevent are distinctly vague and encourage wide 
interpretations: “excitement, comradeship and adventure”, “them and us thinking” and 
“presence of mental illness or personality disorder” are said to be signs of radicalisation 
(NOMS 2014; CAGE 2016). One senior official (Interviewee 7, Regional Prevent Coordinator) 
commented that “The ERG22 plus… it’s 22-and-a-bit factors, very subjective, not a checklist, 
[it’s] a very subjective document.” The document is open to interpretation precisely because it 
must be. As the architect of Prevent Professor Sir David Omand (Interviewee 12) mentioned, 
the academic debate around why violence occurs is still not settled - and likely never will, given 
how risk can be interpreted so differently. Without this debate being settled, intuition will be 
central to the process of risk-imagining and construction. Because ‘risk’ looks different to 
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everyone, and because the causes of violence are impossible to determine, signs of risk that are 
present only in those who would go on to be engaged in violence cannot be taught or written 
down because they exist only in the imaginary space. This was particularly evident in a 
discrepancy between two practitioners’ understanding of risk. One local authority safeguarding 
lead with responsibility for Prevent (Interviewee 4) noted that “a bad Prevent [practice] would 
be no response. Someone comes in and says ‘pray for Palestine’ in a school classroom and 
nobody responds to that. That’s a bad… That’s misconduct in my opinion.” When this was put 
to another official (Interviewee 7, Regional Prevent Coordinator) they contested this view, 
saying, “It’s quite wrong to pick [that example] out of a list of items and say ‘that is a 
problem’.” Internal discrepancies were common, exactly because it is necessary that ambiguity 
and different interpretations play a central part in any preemptive ‘risk-managing’ programme. 
The definitional vagueness, because Prevent’s modus operandi is speculating about 
others’ possible future intent based on very indirect data, leads to practitioners mixing 
metaphors. During an interview, one senior Prevent official commented, “So that’s what 
success is for us: disengagement from violent extremism” (Interviewee 7, Regional Prevent 
Coordinator). Similarly, another mentioned Channel mentoring would be offered “if there is 
an individual who needs to be disengaged from terrorism or de-radicalised so to speak” 
(Interviewee 15, national Prevent lead).  ‘Disengagement’ has historically been associated with 
a physical movement away often from gangs or insurgencies, and ‘violent extremism’ and 
‘terrorism’ indicate some level of violence having taken place. But a number of practitioners 
explained that many Channel cases had never even mentioned violence (including Interviewee 
8, Channel mentor; Interviewee 10, Channel mentor). Yet this programme is supposedly related 
to non-criminality, with criminal cases being passed up to the Pursue arm of CONTEST. 
Similarly, in an official Prevent Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training 
session, the trainer (also Interviewee 5, Prevent Coordinator) mentioned that “It’s fine for 
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people to have their views but when it crosses to criminality that’s when we step in.” Moments 
like these - which were consistent across interviews - divulge the seeming blurriness 
practitioners experience between criminal and non-criminal subjectivities. Similarly, one 
mentor suggested that only “possibly one” individual he had intervened with was likely to pose 
some risk, yet he later stated that “many of my cases I’ve been able to clearly say ‘look I believe 
the person no longer poses a threat, he’s been successfully de-radicalised’ [author’s 
emphasis].” Apparent internal discrepancies like these were a relatively common occurrence. 
These confusions and the blurriness are an understandable but concerning consequence of the 
discursive constitution of ‘risk-infused identities’. 
Fascinatingly, one official appeared physically uncomfortable at - and contested - the 
suggestion that ‘signs of radicalisation’ should even be considered hazardous. The extract from 
his interview sits in awkward juxtaposition with how another practitioner (Interviewee 13, 
Channel mentor) saw his role: as a “violence prevention practitioner”. The extract is a revealing 
insight into how definitions become confused when they are submerged in opacity because of 
their relationship with unknown futures. Asked What do you see as the most hazardous 
vulnerabilities and signs of radicalisation?, he replied: 
 
In terms of the most hazardous, I don’t think we would ever look at what was most 
hazardous. Because we’re always very keen to say everyone’s different, we’re 
individuals, path of radicalisation and vulnerabilities is uniquely different, and it’s 
really I think potentially misleading if you talk about the most hazardous signs. 
(Interviewee 17, national Prevent lead) 
 
Somehow, the same interviewee later remarked in a comment that “the logical end result of 
that radicalisation is that you're wanting to stop them from committing an act based on that 
radicalisation.” This utterance demonstrates how ‘hazard’ could surely be an appropriate 
conceptualisation if ‘acts’ (presumably of terrorism) are being considered as “the logical end-
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result”. Yet contradictions like these were not uncommon, and are the outcome of working 
through ambiguity, which itself is a state that results from a requirement of preemptive counter-
terrorism to arbitrarily fix identities based on future possibilities. 
Van de Weert and Eijkman’s study of youth workers in detecting ‘radicalisation’ 
indicated that ambiguous aims and conceptual definitions follow the programme through into 
the implementation stage (2018; also see Dresser 2019). Humans’ varied exposure to “a mix 
of facts, [and their own] norms, values and personal feelings” contribute to different 
interpretations of people’s behaviour, which in turn lead to how supposed mal-intent and ‘risk’ 
are imagined (van de Weert and Eijkman 2018, 17). The role of personal intuition in imagining 
risk was occasionally narrated in interviews as a necessary and even advantageous component 
of Prevent: two officials mentioned their ‘gut feeling’ as a useful tool in conceiving where risk 
might be located (Interviewee 9, former Prevent Police; Interviewee 6, Prevent Coordinator). 
But where it wasn't discussed as a beneficial attribute, subjective interpretation - otherwise bias 
and value-laden preconceptions - was described as necessary and natural, and importantly as 
unproblematic. One mentor spoke of how “[measurement of a Channel case’s progression] 
depends on our individual capability or judgement, subjective or otherwise. There's nothing 
hard and fast” (Interviewee 10, Channel mentor). Strategic actors talked of the judgement 
public servants must deploy in imagining security risks, something considered fundamental to 
the programme’s success. One official, a national lead on Prevent, remarked, 
 
I think it comes down again to that professional judgement of the professionals who 
know the individual - if they notice something that doesn’t sit right with them, then 





However, another Prevent national lead (Interviewee 17) reflected that fixing identities through 
risk-imagining was difficult because of the centrality of the unknown: 
 
But again that’s one of the most problematic areas of Prevent delivery. Because you're 
talking about aspects in someone’s behaviour that quite plausibly that could be 
completely benign, absolutely. It’s really really hard, I've found that one of the most 
challenging aspects. 
 
Banality has been central to the rollout of Prevent (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018). Benign 
behaviours have been established in this policy area as signs of dangerousness in order to 
ensure those who might actually engage in future violence have a greater chance of being 
engulfed in the net, leading to these epistemological dilemmas faced by practitioners (Elshimi 
2017, 54-58). 
The social production of risk was consistently referred to, again as unproblematic and 
even desirable. One former official (Interviewee 9, former Prevent Police) mentioned that the 
“best thing about Prevent is there’s not just one practitioner, so I could go to [another 
practitioner] and say ‘what’s your feelings on this?’ and come to a conclusion.” Another 
(Interviewee 6, Prevent Coordinator) remarked, “I don’t think [the Channel panel] would agree 
to somebody exiting the process if they didn’t feel certain that that person was no longer at risk 
of any harm or there's no longer any threat.” Those determining these future security risks are 
largely safeguarding leads, producing knowledge around where risk may or may not exist, 
which then feeds back into itself further down the line and self-justifies the logic - including 
the national discourse on the Prevent programme, which then generates more knowledge as 
‘truth’ (Elshimi 2017, 100-125). As Merlingen (2011, 155) writes, “Expertise grounds 
governmentalities”: governance is constructed by these ‘safeguarding experts’ performing 
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counter-terrorism duties, and with the logic of Prevent working only in the speculative realm, 
it becomes clear that the entire project serves merely to fulfil itself. 
One practitioner commented on the lack of standardisation across the country: 
 
I imagine the judgment as to where things fall into that category versus what's dealt 
with locally probably varies across cultures and sectors, how experienced they feel 
dealing with vulnerable people, and down again to judgement of individuals. 
(Interviewee 16, national Prevent lead) 
 
Assertions like these were not uncommon; the lack of objectivity present in Prevent training 
administered to institutions around the country was even accepted: 
 
To be honest their hearts [are] in the right place [but] because it’s such a contentious 
area… it’s very difficult for some people not to bring their own prejudices or views into 
it. (Interviewee 6, Prevent Coordinator) 
 
The ambiguous and subjective working conditions of Prevent - and any preemptive security 
regime - leads to subjective interventions along individual or publicly-held biases, which at 
best do not dismantle historic conceptions of the ‘Other’, and at worst compound binary 
distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Preemptive counter-terrorism is founded ultimately on a 
culture of violence thesis (Sellin 1938; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967) and ‘new barbarism’ 
thesis (Tuastad 2003), both of which claim that risk exists within certain groups and 
communities - often along racial lines and without considering wider contexts or environments 
(Springer 2015; Sian 2017). Moreover, the solution posed to combat violence is often 
engagement with these groups as specific and separate entities, as Hillyard (1993) and Pantazis 
and Pemberton (2009) explore with regard to constructed ‘suspect communities’. Despite 
suggesting ‘them and us thinking’ is a sign of radicalisation, the ‘Other’ is central to work in 
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Prevent; distinguishing ‘probably good’ (us) from ‘possibly bad’ (them) is its very purpose. 
One mentor (Interviewee 8), who occasionally criticised the Prevent apparatus but who saw it 
as a least bad option, explicitly took the culture of violence idea to task: 
 
Muslim millennials have a particular set of problems, which is [that] their lived 
experience of their identity - religious and cultural - is one that is inextricably tied in 
with images of violence and concerns about extremism and terrorism. If you play a 
word association game, what's the first word you hear with the word Muslim? 
 
Earlier iterations of Prevent that emphasised community-cohesion work assumed the 
culture of violence logic explicitly (Thomas 2014), but with the inception of Channel pilots in 
2007 and its national rollout in 2012, outwardly at least the culture of violence theory is 
becoming individualised. This is not a wholesale or unqualified claim, by any means: one 
Prevent Coordinator (Interviewee 6) discussed structural similarities between the conflict in 
Northern Ireland and mainland Britain today, 
 
There’re maybe some good connections that can be made because again if you take 
away the ideology, there’s not too many middle-class Catholics from Malone Road who 
joined the IRA if you know what I mean. 
 
Regardless of whether risk is understood to sit within communities, or within individuals 
emanating from certain communities, the idea behind the ‘culture of violence’ argument - that 
broader political factors are less important than the internal problems of those demonstrating 
‘risk’ - is still immanent. The critical mentor may be able to sit within Prevent and harbour 
despair about the consequences of the culture of violence perspective for the following reason: 
structures of preemptive counter-terrorism are being so depoliticised and individualised that 
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the culture of violence epistemology driving programmes like Prevent is hidden from their own 
actors. 
The rationale of Othering is so powerful that one mentor (Interviewee 10) stressed that 
the ‘signs of radicalisation’ have been “devised scientifically, it is not some people say 
applicable to normal citizens and people (emphasis added)”. This claim, that there is some 
identifiable distinction between ‘normal citizen’ and Channel cases, came despite a previous 
admission that many individuals receiving Channel support have never talked or apparently 
thought about violence. If the distinction was so objective, ‘normal citizens’ would not be 
caught up in the process: yet only around 5% of people referred to Prevent are ultimately 
offered a Channel intervention (HM Government 2017, 2018) - let alone the uncounted number 
of attempted referrals not accepted by the local receiving officer (Interviewee 15, national 
Prevent lead). In a significant update of Prevent’s remit, the 2011 Prevent Strategy deemed so-
called ‘non-violent extremism’ a matter of concern to Prevent, which broadens and makes more 
banal the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This expansion of the net was abundantly clear 
during WRAP training: one slide read that “religious extremism [is] groups [that] operate 
outside of normal religious practices.” This biopolitical urge to examine all life “to ‘make’ live 
and ‘let’ die” (Foucault 2004, 241) different aspects of life creates a two-tier system. 
Behaviours and thoughts imagined to be unproductive are discouraged, and behaviours and 
thoughts imagined to be productive are encouraged. Given that under this model what 
constitutes productivity is imagined and determined by the rest of society, minority suspect 
communities emerge which are comprised of the supposed ‘unproductive’ echelon of society 
(Hillyard 1993). 
For many scholars (Kundnani 2009; Mythen et al. 2009; Heath-Kelly 2012b; Awan, 
2012, 2013), various practitioners (including Interviewee 8, Channel mentor; Interviewee 13, 
Channel mentor), and the experience of many individuals subject to Prevent referrals and 
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interventions (Prevent Watch 2018), these distinctions are often drawn along racialised lines. 
One mentor (Interviewee 13) mentioned that “we are being disproportionate in how we’re 
treating Muslims. This again fuels the negative anti-Prevent that is a toxic agenda 
environment.” The mentor then ranted passionately for two minutes against discrimination in 
the justice system between Muslims and everybody else, remarking that it happens precisely 
“cos they say [contraventions by Muslims are] in opposition to the state, in pursuance of 
political ideology” where non-Muslim contraventions are seen less in opposition to the state. 
WRAP training with Interviewee 5 corroborated this: it continually referred to ‘Islamist-
inspired extremism’ or ‘international terrorism’ and with wider political implications, whereas 
‘right-wing’ crimes were repeatedly discussed as hate crimes, operating on an individual level. 
The establishment of British values as the antithesis - and antidote - to ‘extremism’ and 
‘terrorism’ (HM Government 2011, 27), encourages “disassociations from ‘Britishness’” to be 
seen through the lens of security (Martin 2014). Individuals demonstrating such divergence are 
acted on in order to “put them on a safer path” (Interviewee 6, Prevent Coordinator) and to 
reconstitute their subjectivities as within the mainstream. Central to the notion of British values 
is the inside/outside position it forces citizens to take. Indeed, in one interview used for this 
piece, a Regional Prevent Coordinator (Interviewee 7) leant in, lowered his voice, and 
ominously pronounced about the ‘anti-Prevent lobby’ that “they have an ideological purpose 
to get rid of counter-terrorism, just dwell on that, there’s a reason behind it!” At that moment, 
it was vividly clear what was being communicated. Similarly, Home Secretary Sajid David 
said in 2018 (quoted in Hymas 2018) that some critics are “actually on the side of extremists.” 
These inside/outside identifiers - in this case how far British values and even counter-terrorism 
itself are supported - function to demonstrate one’s capacity to engage in productive life or 
pose some supposed threat. 
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Rather than being some correctable process, technologies that function through 
subjective human interaction to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’, ‘beneficial’ from ‘unproductive’ 
or ‘more-risky’ from ‘less-risky’, will necessarily ensure the distinctions are imbued with bias 
and preconceptions. This element of modern preemptive counter-terrorism strategies has 
created “troubling dichotomies between moderate and radical Islam, or ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
Muslims” (Jarvis 2017, 3) that then feed back into the system, leading to several interviewees 
complaining about racism within the very structure they administer. 
 
Concerned concern, safeguarding and the unknown 
Prevention and preemption in counter-terrorism, being necessarily associated with stopping 
undesirable and destructive futures from occurring, requires the observation (and illumination) 
of certain behaviours or populations through the lens of security. At a structural level - in 
national discourse, for example - suspicion is seen as the vehicle through which greater security 
is achieved (Heath-Kelly 2012a). But at the level of implementation, overt suspicion is much 
less obvious, and in many cases hardly apparent at all. This section looks at how possibly 
divergent individuals and behaviour are viewed through the eyes of diluted suspicion or 
‘concerned concern’, how safeguarding has become associated with counter-terrorism, and the 
centrality of the unknown. At this point it is crucial to note that ‘risk’ in broader safeguarding 
largely relates to protecting subjects - often children - from external risk, but in the context of 
this discussion on Prevent, ‘risk’ relates to protecting society from the subjects’ own supposed 
threat because of the dual-function of supporting the individual and protecting society against 
them. Whilst gang-related safeguarding also demonstrates this dual utility, this form of 
safeguarding differs by suggesting risk factors are habitual physical behaviours like “persistent 
offending” (HM Government 2010, 19) rather than Prevent’s fixation upon an individual’s 
possible beliefs. Moreover, gang-related safeguarding places a significant emphasis on an 
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subject’s physical environment, such as “high unemployment [and] sustained poverty” (HM 
Government 2010: 19), rather than the Prevent model which emphasises the interpretation of 
an individual’s possible cognitive experience of reality, considering them outside a structural 
environment (see the ERG factors in NOMS 2014; also publicly in CAGE 2016). 
Across all of the author’s interviews, there was only one instance where any reference 
to the word ‘suspect’ was deployed, and even then it was in the context of Prevent critics: 
“Their observations [say] it securitises Muslims, to create an air of suspicion” (Interviewee 10, 
Channel mentor). Unlike in national discourse, where the term “suspicion” is routinely 
mobilised to enact some behavioural change in the population (many councils, safeguarding 
boards, and local police forces across the country are running a campaign with the tagline, “If 
you suspect it, report it”), practitioners relied upon “concern” to narrate their roles. A Channel 
mentor (Interviewee 8) remarked that “Channel, fundamentally, is in the pre-crime space. So 
we’re not talking about people who have broken the law yet, but there are concerns.” Similarly, 
a Prevent Coordinator (Interviewee 6) said that “the majority [of referrals] are based around 
concerning behaviours and actions.” One Channel mentor (Interviewee 13) did not even discuss 
suspicion despite analogising pre-crime with post-crime cases - where the post-crime cases 
retrospectively deserve some level of suspicion. Overwhelmingly, the sentiment from 
practitioners was not of outright suspicion of Channel cases they encountered, but of concern 
both for and against the individual. They wanted to make sure the individual was receiving 
support, yet practitioners also viewed them as negatively divergent. This dichotomy was neatly 
represented by a Regional Prevent Coordinator (Interviewee 7): 
 
Support comes in many forms, it isn’t necessarily ‘you're a victim let’s put an arm 
around you’ sometimes it’s ‘well you're problematic but let’s support you to move to a 




This can be captured by the phrase ‘concerned concern’: the adjective preceding the noun 
demonstrates how the concern itself can be perturbing, associating it at some level with a more 
overt cognitive suspicion, even if practitioners do not narrate any apparent suspicion that these 
individuals have intent to commit a crime, let alone an act of violence. Because the duties of 
Prevent practitioners are so diffusely spread - even amongst the relatively few (60-70) Channel 
mentors who undertake the 300-400 ‘most concerning’ interventions per year - a theme that 
practitioners often referenced was of a lack of demonstrable risk in their subjects. This is a 
result of the fact that Prevent operates so far back temporally from any discernible intent to 
commit violence to the point where mentors will often not bring up the idea of violence into 
intervention sessions because they do not want to introduce the concept to their Channel cases 
(Interviewee 8; Interviewee 10). One Prevent Coordinator (Interviewee 6) summed up the lack 
of apparent risk, and how concern can operate as a supportive mechanism in relation to a 
concerning potential future: 
 
If I say ‘I dealt with 30 individuals’ I highly doubt that there’s 30 would-be terrorists 
there who would’ve gone on to do something… But at the very least I can say that there 
woulda been 30 individuals and their life wasn’t going exactly as they'd planned, and 
they were having issues with something or other, and they had the potential to become 
violent, and we’ve put in place measures to at the very least make their circumstances 
in life a wee bit better. 
 
So whilst they drive the regime’s epistemology, worst case logics do not obviously transpose 
into practitioner experience. Such ideas were more present in strategic actors’ accounts and in 
WRAP training. One senior official (Interviewee 7, Regional Prevent Coordinator) mentioned 
that “We’re not gonna stop every terrorist attack, we’re not gonna be able to disengage 
everybody, but we want to try.” Similarly, WRAP training stressed: “Don’t assume anything, 
watch carefully… Radicalisation doesn’t happen overnight, but stopping the warning signs can 
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protect your family… Learn about the signs before it’s too late!” But despite these accounts 
that echoed the broader discourse around Prevent, the vast majority of individual practitioners 
saw their role overwhelmingly as providing a supportive service to vulnerable people against 
the backdrop of concerned concern. 
The ‘concerned concern’ paradox indicates the dual-constitutions of citizens that takes 
suspicion as implicit. The fusion of logics of care with security-based risk-management 
considerations is explored to some extent by O’Loughlin (2018), in the context of supposed 
risk posed by some individuals in prison and psychiatric wards being considered for release 
(also see: Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018). This dual role mentioned by practitioners (is Channel 
supporting them, or protecting society from them?), is illustrative of the constitution of citizens 
as possible allies and possible threats. Heath-Kelly talks of the autoimmune response triggered 
by the detection of risk coming from within - bolstered by the discourse around the 
‘homegrown nature’ of the threat (Heath-Kelly 2017; also see Mythen et al. 2009). Citizens 
under this epistemology are taught to be ever-vigilant, looking to spot where possible trouble 
exists in their own environment. Anyone travelling on public transport in Britain is regularly 
reminded to be security-conscious through the “See it, say it, sorted” campaign. Over-reporting 
is commended (WRAP training emphasises “it might not be anything… but it could be 
something”) to encourage the viewing of those around us as possible locations of risk. One 
mentor gave an example of what this rationale leads to: 
 
In other places you're right, we have people who just see someone praying who wasn't 
praying before, and get all risk-averse and hysterical, and so they’ve conflated religious 
observance and conservatism, with violent extremism. (Interviewee 13) 
 
Identity-fixing, as explored, is not a neutral or valueless phenomenon; it is steeped in bias and 
personal judgments. Being undergirded with suspicion, concerned concern in counter-terrorism 
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is the combination of these subjective perceptions, based on an unknown future, and even on 
fantasy (Jackson 2012). The prominence of what is essentially diluted suspicion with some 
supportive motivation, though, is a necessary feature of preemptive counter-terrorism 
implementation that requires people or behaviours to be spotted before their supposed risk 
materialises. 
In line with the paradox underpinning concerned concern, the contested term 
‘safeguarding’ for counter-terrorism duties has emerged (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018). This 
word typifies the dilemma that those implementing a preemptive programme face, and the 
necessary role of some (latent) suspicion - even if a secondary motivation. One mentor 
(Interviewee 1) illuminated: “[My job is] safeguarding that person from harm, and 
safeguarding them from further risk of putting themselves in jeopardy [author’s emphasis].” 
Where other forms of safeguarding are designed to support an individual from suffering further 
harm that has been established, under a preemptive counter-terrorism regime this is only 
partially the case, with officials taking on the role of protecting society from them. In contrast 
with the only other model that seeks to protect society as well - gang-related safeguarding - 
referrals (and by extension suspicion) should be based on demonstrable physical behaviour 
including actual criminality and aggression (HM Government 2010, 19). Yet Prevent directs 
suspicion towards more indirect - and almost exclusively psychological - signs that may or may 
not point towards possible future mal-intent (NOMS 2014). Yet because of the banal and 
diffuse level at which practitioners operate, it has been possible for their duties to be mapped 
onto safeguarding structures already in place and any contradictions sidelined. As the 
‘safeguarding logic’ has taken hold, teachers (and many other public servants) in an 
“overwhelming majority” accept it as another element of their existing safeguarding duties 
(Busher et al. 2017, 6). Safeguarding takes a central role in the Channel Duty Guidance, which 
stresses that Channel-related officials have a responsibility to “ensure that children, young 
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people and adults are protected from harm” (HM Government 2015a, 4). Prevent was explained 
in various ways during interviews as “just a common-sense safeguarding duty… it’s quite 
boring in many respects” (Interviewee 6, Prevent Coordinator), although this interviewee later 
accepted it sits in a “funny space” because of its counter-terrorism remit. This multiple 
constitution was discussed more openly by one practitioner (Interviewee 5, Prevent 
Coordinator): 
 
Safeguarding is where we talk about it sitting, to be sensitive around the topic and the 
subject, and to get people engaged [and it] tends to pull people in… Safeguarding is the 
softer title for it I think that engages people, well, communities, more. 
 
Regardless of its intended purpose, how differently practitioners see its role, or how it operates 
with another (often-unspoken) component in contrast to other forms of safeguarding, it is 
incumbent to ask: what are the consequences of Prevent’s association with safeguarding, what 
does this association allow? Considering Prevent as a safeguarding technology has three very 
apparent results: firstly, it discourages critical reflection of its purpose (as other forms of 
safeguarding are hardly controversial), secondly it banalises the threshold around what 
constitutes risk, and thirdly, it rescinds the agency of those who rightly or wrongly would 
oppose capitalism, British values and everything else Prevent seeks to protect. All three 
consequences are able to be identified in the interview extracts about safeguarding provided 
above, to some extent. 
Because the dual role of concerned concern underpinning Prevent - and any preemptive 
counter-terrorism project - includes some focus on individuals’ perceived possible divergence, 
Prevent functions in part through a “plethora of mediated future imaginaries” (Martin 2014) 
based on the unknown (Jackson 2015). Practitioners consistently referred to the idea of never 
knowing what risk was posed, never being able to gauge success. One Channel mentor 
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(Interviewee 10) remarked that determining risk “can never be done 100% and you can never 
be totally confident.” Because the logic of preemption works through a lack of knowledge, a 
state of cognitive insecurity is unavoidable. As Ewald (2008: 76) writes, “Preemptive security 
trumps justice, and insecurity proves itself.” As an inherently neoliberal apparatus with a 
rationale of governing society that looks at everything as a potential future security risk to be 
managed (Omand 2010, 11; also see Walker 2009), Prevent will only seek to pin down all 
possible security-outcomes regardless of their likelihood. It will consider missed opportunities 
as only having required more information, which, in this realm of guessing somebody’s future 
mal-intent, equates to greater suspicion. As its logic spreads abroad (Thornton and Bouhana 
2017), the consequences of such an approach is important to consider. 
 
‘Fixing’ the ‘deficits’ 
So where does this preemptive logic - with its varied identity-fixing and suspicion-laden 
concern - lead? In the context of normativity, how are these undesirable traits overcome? This 
final section reiterates how the two characteristics of subjective positioning of Others, and 
suspicion, are fundamentally necessary for a counter-radicalisation regime, by looking at some 
of the main areas through which actors have thought to de-securitise and de-stigmatise 
preemptive counter-terrorism. 
Many practitioners mused about having to implement a policy based on a lack of 
information, yet the prominence and necessity of the unknown were not considered a chronic 
impairment; many merely complained that critics never provided alternative solutions to 
govern this unknown - and unknowable - space. Rather, they pointed to more training and 
awareness as solutions. Indeed, along these lines, the name of official Prevent training 
Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent, indicates (as well as the internality of the regime) 
the priority of improving knowledge around and cognisance of counter-terrorism 
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responsibilities. Examples of abject failure were occasionally rejected for being not the fault of 
Prevent but of “ignorant” people calling in for being “worried about any range of things” 
(Interviewee 8, Channel mentor). The same mentor also  spoke of their frustration that 
beheading videos from Syria had been referred so frequently, remarking “that’s really 
important to have that clarity [that such videos were not ‘signs of radicalisation’], but 
unfortunately it’s not been consistent across the country.” Yet, because every individual’s 
trajectory into violence differs - a point vociferously emphasised by practitioners - and the 
venture of counter-radicalisation is concerned with unknown futures, “there are… no clear 
signs of terror to be identified” (Jackson 2015, 39) and more information will not help identify 
individuals’ future possible intent. 
Despite this, to a varying degree, almost all interviewees suggested that more research 
to understand individual psychology, more joined-up thinking by different organisations, and 
more learning by citizens of what constitutes risk, will lead to fewer “false positives” (Heath-
Kelly 2012a). If this happens, went the logic, misunderstandings will be overcome and 
‘inappropriate’ referrals minimised. Whilst accepting that there were inconsistencies within 
Prevent - and talking of his desire to improve it from within - one mentor (Interviewee 13) 
stressed: 
 
People say ‘oh disproportionate focus on Islam, not the far-right’ and I've gone into 
areas that it’s 50/50. Or if anything it’s 70% of hate crime is far-right. There you go! 
Or people say ‘inappropriate referrals’ and those organisations have been told ‘don’t do 
it again’ and they haven't. You know, better training, organisations have had five-day 
programmes or more in-depth training to understand that it shouldn’t be based on 





Whilst this may sound persuasive - after all, enhanced training on any duty probably means 
better execution of the process - the programme’s very foundations work through people 
spotting risk as an intuitive function, which is based on internally-justified and subjective 
understanding of what constitutes risk in the first instance. Value-based judgments on whether 
others’ behaviour has the potential to lead to criminality will remain central, regardless of how 
diffusely the responsibility is spread and how informed people are about what possible ‘signs’ 
to look out for. Even where humans are stepping out of the process and algorithms being 
developed to supposedly spot the signs (Gill 2015, 110), any automated process will only ever 
produce a façade of objectivity; it will always be infused with human interaction. What 
constitutes risk will always have prejudice attached because ‘risk’ is intimately related with the 
unknown and the Other. Wilcox (2017) writes that regardless of the method (including where 
algorithms are involved) human prejudice is consistent and integral to all decision-making. 
This is particularly obvious in Prevent when public servants - and the wider population - are 
pressed to report based on their intuition, and gut feeling is prioritised as a useful tool of 
observation and identification. 
One solution posited as a remedy to the lack of knowledge, and of counter-
radicalisation/extremism as pejorative mechanisms, is their more expansive and ‘everyday’ 
rollout. Some mentors argued for counter-radicalisation activities to be embedded entirely 
within safeguarding (including Interviewee 1, Channel mentor; Interviewee 11, Channel 
mentor). Indeed, one (Interviewee 1) noted his objection to Prevent being developed under 
counter-terrorism legislation, and pronounced that the programme should have been developed 
under safeguarding, victimisation and grooming legislation instead. This mentor commented 
that it is unhelpful to think of Prevent in security terms, and it distorts the reality that Prevent 
should be considered purely as safeguarding. Despite this, in what appears to be a significant 
case of cognitive dissonance, the mentor was so impassioned about the security function of 
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Channel interventions that during the interview, when asked if he thought Prevent had an expiry 
date, he suddenly leant forward into the recording device between us, and half-bellowed: 
 
No! No, I don’t think there will be, I don’t think that. Safeguarding against violent 
extremism in various different forms is safeguarding against extremely violent 
behaviour, having a project that safeguards against people in that area is essential. 
 
More strategic actors spoke of the need for Prevent to remain attached to a counter-terrorism 
agenda, and therefore as explicitly and inextricably tied to the future: 
 
But can it become just safeguarding and nothing else? I think we would miss a trick… 
We still need a strategy that has a budget that reduces that risk. So it’s not safeguarding 
with counter-terrorism, it’s a counter-terrorism strategy that has evolved to become 
more in line with safeguarding [emphasis added]. (Interviewee 7, Regional Prevent 
Coordinator) 
 
Without retaining a risk- (and therefore future-) based focus, the strategy could become a 
counter-racism policy or a project to combat ‘them-and-us’ thinking, because as one mentor 
(Interviewee 8) mentioned, “Racism in itself still deserves [through Prevent] to be tackled.” 
But such a programme would have to negate its future-facing mandate in order to be detached 
from counter-terrorism, as the Regional Prevent Coordinator above pointed out. 
Several practitioners talked of the need to engrain Prevent-conscious (or concerned 
concern) thinking in communities and private life in order to detoxify the policy, ultimately as 
a method to convey identity-fixing as a neutral and natural process. The de-stigmatisation of 
identities linked to counter-terrorism was referred to a number of times, and in particular 




You would never use the word Prevent in the local community in [UK city] because 
they saw it as a police-driven process that was actually discriminative against certain 
cultures within [UK city]. So we said ‘OK we’ll get rid of the term Prevent and work 
in the community and talk about “how do we safeguard these people?”’ It’s amazing 
how people change. (Interviewee 11, Channel mentor) 
 
This account implies there was cognitive (and presumably behavioural) change within the 
target population as a result of a different narrative around the same security-infused 
responsibilities (albeit with some protective function if the idea of ‘concerned concern’ is to be 
followed through). Reframing security policy as a social safeguard discourages actors from 
questioning the basis of their duties (Dresser 2018), broadening the scope for security to 
become more firmly embedded in the everyday. 
In a similar vein, another practitioner (Interviewee 5, Prevent Coordinator) discussed 
the extension of Prevent into citizens’ private lives: 
 
You might be sitting [in WRAP training representing a private organisation] thinking 
‘what’s the point of this for me? I don’t wanna be here.’ Actually whether or not this is 
relevant to your job role, this is relevant because you live in a [UK county] community. 
 
Because humans exist socially, goes the logic, regardless of context there is a responsibility on 
everyone to ensure we are assuming some role of concerned concern, in order to bestow some 
new imagined identity on unsuspecting others - yet these identities are being constructed as not 
necessarily pejorative, and as essential. At time of writing this challenge has just been extended 
to children who, according to a senior police officer, are being encouraged to spot risk in others 
and help reconstitute the identities of their peers as security-concerned (Blunden 2018). Along 
these lines, Operation Dovetail is being rolled out, in a move explicitly “aiming to de-securitise 
the process by transferring responsibilities for some elements of Channel from the police to 
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local government” (Local Government Association 2018). The securitisation of certain 
constructed ‘suspect communities’ - largely Muslims and those perceived as Muslims - has 
been a constant criticism of Prevent, recognised as the case by several practitioners. ‘De-
securitising’ the preemptive counter-terrorism space by moving a policy away from a criminal 
behaviour-related institution (the police) and into a generalist institution (the local authority) 
shows how important detoxifying Prevent has become. Yet, wherever any risk-based focus 
remains, no matter how banal or diffuse, intuitive suspicion will remain - necessarily to instil 
subjectivities related to terrorism in order to govern them. Van de Weert and Eijkman (2018, 
18) write that, for those who are given counter-radicalisation responsibilities, in order to fulfil 
their perceived duties they “go the proverbial ‘extra mile’” in providing others with 
reconstituted and security-infused identities, with the result that oft-identified groups feel 
stigmatised. So, no matter how banal counter-terrorism becomes, even if it can now be talked 
about in relation to fox-hunting and motorway-building opposition (Interviewee 5, Prevent 
Coordinator), this suspicion-laden function will remain if supposed future risk is to be 
managed. 
The entire preemptive project is epitomised in how practitioners considered the 
evaluation of their work, which will now be briefly explored. Interviewee 16, a national Prevent 
lead, answering how their role and Prevent help to minimise ‘terrorism’ risk, replied, “It’s like 
measuring success of a preventative agenda. I think - I mean - hopefully we do!” This candid 
account in another context would be disconcerting: if doctors consistently said to their patients 
hopefully that’s what’s wrong, hopefully, this medicine will help clinics would be in crisis 
across the country. But this is an honest account of the future-focused element of ‘concerned 
concern’ without matching it to past demonstrations of persistent behaviour - unlike gang-
related safeguarding where the environment and the subject’s violent behaviour is scrutinised. 
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‘Hopefully’ is the best description they could ever give of their work in bolstering security. A 
Channel mentor (Interviewee 11) spoke of this quandary of evaluation in more detail: 
 
By default, there is evidence there, but it’s very difficult to prove, using reliable tools… 
it’s very very difficult to do that. So, therefore, the only way you can do that is [through] 
part of the psychological intervention.” 
 
The suggestion that evidence that exists ‘by default’ rests on “referential invalidity, the 
rhetorical circularity” (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, iv) of claims about the ‘signs of 
radicalisation’ - claims that these signs demonstrate objective risk, and that management of 
them will reduce the security risk. Moreover, in borrowing (psychological) techniques and 
evaluation tools only presumed to be related to a security measure, and reconstituting them as 
“the only way” to demonstrate any evidence of risk-minimisation indicates how far the results 
of counter-radicalisation are unknown and unable to be known. 
The dilemma of preemptive work was represented in another discussion about 
evaluation. Where one practitioner (Interviewee 5, Prevent Coordinator) during WRAP 
training said with optimism that local “referral numbers are going up and up, and the referrals 
are getting younger and younger”, a national lead on Prevent (Interviewee 16) was more 
reflective: 
 
I guess we’re very cautious about reading too much into any figures… What do low 
numbers mean? Does that mean actually you’ve got really engaged sectors that are 
safeguarding at a local level doing what they should be doing to look after these 
individuals, or does that mean that actually, you haven't got that awareness-raising - it 
could really be interpreted either way… Are high numbers good or bad, and how do 






Whilst Channel is justified structurally through discourses of “waiting for terror” (Jackson 
2015), these apocalyptic narratives are largely absent in its implementation. Practitioners on 
the ground, believing that minimal risk exists in each individual within the programme, are 
able to narrate their roles as safeguarding workers. Seeing the banal implementation of a 
counter-radicalisation policy may have persuaded many that it is only a safeguarding 
mechanism (Busher et al. 2017), that its logic is far from malign, and that adopting some form 
of preemptive counter-terrorism can lead to people (especially children) being protected from 
harm. Some of this may well be true - indeed, individuals discussed at Channel panels often 
receive expedited support from statutory services - but practitioners in a programme that seeks 
to ‘manage security risks’ must at some level deploy their imaginations about where divergence 
could lead if an intervention was not provided. This meant that whilst practitioners at the heart 
of counter-radicalisation in Britain overwhelmingly do not see their role as terrorism 
prevention or as relating to violence, and cannot be said to be “waiting for terror”, they could 
not cognitively disassociate from considerations of security risk. As a result, they adopted the 
duties of fixing identities along the grounds of the arbitrary signs of radicalisation, and viewing 
citizens through the lens of ‘concerned concern’. Importantly this security-infused concern 
comes without the physical evidence utilised in gang-related safeguarding (such as violent 
behaviour and historical criminality), and is instead based on the subject’s presumed opinions 
and beliefs. 
One cornerstone of preemptive counter-terrorism implementation is that individuals 
(and society at large) are filtered and sorted into categories, in order to be acted upon in line 
with their new prescribed identities. This subjectification, by all accounts, is not a neutral 
process but is intimately concerned with identifying the ‘Other’ according to preconceived 
judgments about what constitutes otherness. Yet this logic sees subjectivity as a desirable 
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mechanism through which to sort ‘risk’; in the case of Prevent, everyone is able to produce 
knowledge in the realm of counter-terrorism. Under this circular logic, anybody can report 
anybody else for demonstrating terrorism-related motives, and safeguarding leads (in the 
Channel panels) become counter-terrorism experts. Governing possible future intent will 
always be imbued with valued and biased interpretation. Prevent and other preemptive security 
structures do not make possible the performance of identity distinctions between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’, or ‘more-risky’ and ‘less-risky’, ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’. However, they 
encourage citizens to distinguish others on binary signifiers (Jarvis 2017) which in turn 
recreates and reproduces social reality through divisions and separation, rather than unity. 
A distinction that has been little emphasised (only by implication in work such as 
Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018, and by extension in Lipsky 1980) is how ‘suspicion’ is deployed 
on significantly different measures from overt national discourse. Where public narratives are 
overladen with ominous sentiment that implies some impending doom, practitioners with 
diffuse responsibilities situate their roles far more as operating through protective mechanisms 
than as a security apparatus. This article has shown how the preemptive logic functions through 
‘concerned concern’, in both a supportive-of and protective-against role. Whilst the supportive 
of, the non-security infused element of concern helps practitioners (and government) to frame 
the work of Prevent around safeguarding, any regime with a risk-based function necessitates 
the protective-against element. Importantly, this is outworked again through prejudice and 
judgments made using knowledge that could never be complete, because it is making 
assumptions about others’ possible future trajectories. No matter how banalised the suspicion 
behind concerned concern becomes, no matter how disparate it appears from national policy 
through the diffusion of implementation: it must appear in any preemptive ‘risk-managing’ 
project. The product of detoxified identity-construction in a context of banalised suspicion is a 
downward spiral: where terrorism is no longer considered a political act, where counter-
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terrorism duties are being accepted as one-dimensional protective mechanisms, and where 
children are being encouraged to perform security-monitoring tasks. 
The violence implicit in the reconstitution and re-categorisation of individuals into 
spaces for state intervention (de Goede 2008) is inherent in ‘counter-radicalisation’ and 
‘counter-extremism’ logics. Whilst preemptive programmes may have a cognitively, socially 
or economically stabilising impact on some individuals, any outcome is necessarily anecdotal 
because outcomes can only ever be posited against counterfactual alternatives. However banal 
a regime’s implementation, however far it can be connected with other forms of safeguarding, 
it will always require firstly the intensely subjective, ill-informed and binary fixing of identities 
into ‘threatening’ and ‘non-threatening’, and secondly some level of security-centric 
‘concerned concern’. Even taking the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and applying them 
to state-based violence confers legitimacy upon their consequences (individualisation, 
decontextualisation, and depoliticisation). So, whilst creative parodies like demonstrating the 
“radicalisation of Tony Blair in his journey to the War in Iraq” (Baker-Beall 2018) are 
important to expose the absurdity of preemptive rationales, to accept these terms and the logic 
they produce as possibly emancipatory would overwrite a history of critical approaches. With 
the necessary characteristics of preemptive counter-terrorism implementation in mind, rather 
than follow Prevent’s demand for everyone to just “get with the programme” (Interviewee 3, 
Channel mentor), in line with its emancipatory agenda CTS should seek constructive and 
creative ways of challenging hegemonic discourse around risk and othering in our societies. 
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